As Rivers Swallow More Russian Vehicles, The Russians Are Deploying DIY Bridgelayers
Take half of an assault bridge and stick it on a turtle tank
Struggling to cross a small river north of Myrnohrad, Russian forces may be deploying a new kind of bridgelayer: an up-armored Russian turtle tank with a short metal span attached to its front. The kind of span that, hastily dropped over the narrowest stretch of a small river, could help trailing vehicles and infantry quickly cross that river and continue their attack.
The apparent new improvised bridgelayer, first identified by open-source analyst Moklasen, is crude and probably unwieldy. And it may have failed in one of its earliest deployments.
But many of Russia’s improvised assault vehicles—welded together in front-line workshops in response to changing battlefield conditions—don’t work until they abruptly do work ... and help Russian troops advance deeper into Ukraine.
The improvised bridgelayer signals a tactical shift as the Center Group pivots from urban fighting to open terrain. If the Russians solve their river-crossing problem, the 50-km path to Kramatorsk—the last major Ukrainian-held city in Donetsk—opens for a full-scale advance.
Moklasen first noted the bridge-equipped turtle tank in the aftermath of a Friday clash between the Center Group of Forces and the Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps around the village of Novotoretske, 7 km north of the ruins of the town of Myrnohrad in Donetsk Oblast.
Having mostly captured Myrnohrad and the neighboring town of Pokrovsk in recent weeks, the Russian group of forces—150,000 strong—is reorienting its two-year offensive to the last major free settlements in Donetsk: the twin cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, 50 km north of Myrnohrad.
The problem for the Russians is that the infantry-led assaults that helped them capture Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, one rubble-filled block at a time, might not work on the largely open terrain between Myrnohrad and Kramatorsk.
Infantry work best on the offense in towns and cities, where buildings and rubble help to hide them from drones. Fields and widely scattered villages don’t offer the same kind of continuous coverage.
The urban battles for Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad favored the Russians with their abundance of infantry. They disfavored the manpower-starved Ukrainians with their abundance of drones. North of Myrnohrad, the advantage may flip. Here, there are precious few places for Russian infantry to hide from Ukrainian drones.
It’s not for no reason the Russians have shifted back to mechanized assaults in vehicles wrapped in anti-drone armor.




